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ABSTRACT 
 
Lindsay Ayling: State Power, Popular Resistance, and Competing Nationalist Narratives in 
France, 1791-1871 
(Under the direction of Lloyd S. Kramer) 
 
 
In this thesis, I analyze rhetoric surrounding three events in which violence erupted between the 
French authorities and the French “people”: the Champ de Mars massacre of 1791, the June Days 
revolt of 1848, and the Paris Commune of 1871. Studying newspapers, speeches, images, 
memoirs, and literature, I argue that in producing competing narratives surrounding these events, 
politicians and polemicists also shaped competing conceptions of the French nation.  In order to 
justify a given position, they associated either “the people” or the military with French symbols, 
values, and ideals while presenting their opponents as the national enemy. With each subsequent 
civil struggle, they appropriated and altered previous narratives, thereby constructing evolving 
but still irreconcilable versions of the nation. I conclude that because nationalism fractures on 
ideological lines, it is impossible to realize a single, unified conception of a national essence.  
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Introduction 
On September 8, 1871, Louis Rossel appeared before a Versailles tribunal to answer 
accusations of treason. As the Paris Commune’s former Delegate for War, prosecutors alleged, 
Rossel had condemned “citizens who refused to march against the French Army” to death, labor, 
or imprisonment. He was further charged with “lead[ing] military operations against the 
legitimate government of France…[because] he did not hesitate for an instant, despite his 
military position and the rank he occupied in the army, to raise arms against France.”1 In short, a 
man who had previously judged treason cases against Parisians who failed to fight for the 
Commune later found himself charged with treason for taking up arms against Versailles.  
Rossel countered that he was no traitor and had in fact acted out of “devotion to my 
patrie.” The Commune was not an insurrection against France, but rather a patriotic movement 
that aimed to defend his nation against its most powerful enemy. It was born out of “vigorous 
opposition to the Prussians,” he maintained, because “the first irregular act of the Parisian 
population was to seize the cannons in order to prevent them from falling into Prussian hands.” 
When tribunal President Merlin accused him of betraying the French flag by fighting under the 
Communard red and against the tricolor, Rossel cited historical precedent. “In 1814, when Ney 
and Labédoyère raised the army against…a government more solidly established than the one I 
attacked, the whole army followed this movement; they tore up the white flag that was the flag of 
France in order to take up the tricolor.”2 
                                                             
1
 Louis Nathaniel Rossel, Mémoirs, procès et correspondence, ed. Roger Stéphane (Montreuil : Jean-Jacques 
Pauvert, 1960), 329. 
 
2
 Ibid, 332-333. 
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 Rossel was of course correct to point out that the tricolor had often been the flag of 
insurrection. But during the June Days of 1848, partisans of the Second Republic had taken great 
pains to associate the iconic flag with the government and against the working-class rebels. At 
various moments in French history, the tricolor represented republic, monarchy, and empire; it 
was the emblem of both revolution and of “order.”  
 The tricolor was one of many symbols, archetypes, and social groups that became fodder 
for a multi-generational battle over the meaning of the French identity. As a Communard, Rossel 
fought for the France of social revolution, a country in which insurrection was a patriotic act. His 
prosecutors represented the Republic of Order, a France which drew strength from its history of 
revolution but considered any uprising against the current government as an attack against the 
patrie and its revolutionary ideals. Because the Republic of Order and the France of social 
revolution each denied the legitimacy of the other—and because the Republic of Order prevailed, 
at least military, in 1871—Rossel was executed by firing squad.3 In his trial and execution, we 
can observe one practical consequence of a recurring debate in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
France, a debate that centered on the following question: when the French “people” and the 
French armed forces go to war against each other, who is the nation?  
 This French debate raises questions about the broader nature of nationalism, which 
historians generally understand as an ideology that aims to build a united, “imagined 
community.”4 Many have found it useful to analyze nationalism in terms of this intended goal. 
Indeed, it can be expedient—especially when tracing the emergence of nationalism—to describe 
this phenomenon as though a single, coherent nationalist ideology exists in any given nation at 
                                                             
3
 John Merriman, Massacre: The Life and Death of the Paris Commune (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 250. 
 
4
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition 
(London and New York, Verso: 1991).  
 
 
3 
 
any particular point in time. Other scholars, however, have demonstrated that competing forms 
of national memory and identity can exist side-by-side. For example, Karen Hagemann’s recent 
work reveals how different “master narratives” of the Napoleonic Wars reinforced opposing 
notions of Germans as conservative, religious, monarchical subjects and as a people fighting to 
restore its liberties.
5
 This example attests to the fact that fractured nationalism is not limited to 
France alone. 
 When we examine the practical implications of nationalist politics, it becomes clear why 
national identity can never be entirely coherent. As David Bell has defined nationalism, it is “a 
political program which has as its goal not merely to praise, or defend, or strengthen a nation, but 
actively to construct one.”6 We must therefore consider how multiple governments and political 
movements, driven by competing values, enact their own versions of nationalist programs. 
Naturally, they define the nation’s membership and ideals in different ways, thereby constructing 
different iterations of the same nation. Their proponents display these iterations most clearly in 
moments of crisis, when they claim legitimacy by defining their side as the “true” nation and 
their opponents as its enemies.    
We might imagine that when one side of such debates emerges victorious, its version of 
nationalism destroys that of its opponents. Many scholars thus argue that European nationalism 
emerged from its leftist, Jacobin iteration in the eighteenth century but then gave way to a right-
                                                             
5
 Karen Hagemann, Revisiting Prussia’s Wars Against Napoleon: History, Culture, and Memory, trans. Pamela 
Selwyn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). See also Pierre Nora’s work, which touches on a variety of 
contests for French memory, from the Franks vs. the Gauls to the Gaullists vs. the communists. Pierre Nora, ed,  
Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, vol. 1, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, English Language ed. 
Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).    
 
6
 David A. Bell. The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680—1800 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 3. 
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wing, authoritarian ideology by the early twentieth century.
7
 Yet the debates that arose from civil 
struggles in eighteenth and nineteenth century France demonstrate that competing versions of 
nationalist ideology do not simply disappear when their supporters are defeated politically; 
alternative descriptions of the “true” nation endure long after their advocates have been displaced 
from political power. They remain embedded in collective memory partially because of a 
phenomenon Hayden White observed in his classic book, Metahistory. White challenged the 
distinction between a fiction writer who “invents” and a historian who “uncovers” a story, 
arguing that the process of arranging history—of choosing a beginning, middle, and end—means 
that histories will take on literary forms. “In order to figure ‘what really happened’ in the past,” 
White wrote, “the historian must first prefigure as a possible object of knowledge the whole set 
of events reported in the documents.”8  
The polemicists and propagandists who promote various iterations of national identity 
engage in this same type of prefiguration. They then draw upon previously established tropes 
(such as national symbols or gender archetypes) and upon past polemical narratives in order to 
make their narratives recognizable. Nineteenth century radicals often drew parallels to the 
French Revolution of 1789-1799. Karl Marx famously likened the revolutionaries of 1848 to 
play actors who “knew nothing better than to parody…the revolutionary tradition of 1793 to 
1795.”9 More than a century later, François Furet described each major political upheaval in 
nineteenth century France as a re-litigation of the French Revolution.
10
  
                                                             
7
 For one such example see Joep Leersen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2006), 215-7. 
8
 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 6-7, 30. 
 
9
 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1963), 15. 
 
10
 Furet, François. “The French Revolution Revisited.” In The French Revolution: Recent Debates and New 
Controversies, ed. Gary Kates (New York and London: Routledge, 1998). 
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This study argues, however, that the polemicists of 1848 and 1871 did not simply rehash 
earlier arguments. Rather, they drew selectively from pre-existing narratives whenever such 
accounts suited their ideological needs, sometimes altering them to fit changing contemporary 
views of national identity. In the process, they extended opposing definitions of the nation across 
a larger historical timeline. Although I will refer to authors on the “left” and “right” side of 
contemporary political spectrums, it is important to note that even within political camps, 
narratives did not wholly align. These opposing narratives produced various competing and 
overlapping conceptions of the French nation, rather than a simple binary opposition.  
The Champs de Mars Massacre of 1791, the June Days of 1848, and the Paris Commune 
of 1871 serve as illustrative examples for this comparative investigation. In addition to 
occupying prominent places in the French canon of resistance and oppression, these events share 
key historical similarities. In 1791 and 1848, a protesting public violently clashed with ostensibly 
patriotic military units. During the Bloody Week of 1871, the army of Versailles massacred the 
Communards of Paris and the National Guards who had joined their revolution two months 
earlier. Each conflict spurred emphatic debates in which partisans transformed “the people” and 
the soldiers they fought into either symbols of the nation or its archetypal enemies. In 
understanding how competing national narratives were articulated in 1791, we can observe how 
polemicists and politicians appropriated and altered them in 1848 and 1871. Together these 
controversies, and the rhetoric surrounding them, show how opposing political groups construct 
contrasting ideas of the nation, and they reveal the process by which nationalism fractures into 
competing ideological camps. The continued opposition between French nationalist narratives 
further demonstrates the impossibility of realizing a single, unified conception of a national 
essence.  
 
 
6 
 
Tyrannical Peacekeepers and Patriotic Rabble 
On July 17, 1791, Parisian activists gathered on the Champ de Mars to sign a petition 
denouncing the National Assembly’s decision to absolve King Louis XVI for his attempt to flee 
the country almost a month before.
11
 The crowd discovered two men lurking under the altar of 
the fatherland (patrie),
12
 and although these men were probably hiding there in order to look up 
women’s skirts, the crowd accused them of espionage and summarily executed them. In response 
to these killings (and an earlier incident in which someone had tried to shoot the Marquis de 
Lafayette, then Commander of the National Guard), Paris Mayor Jean-Sylvain Bailly
13
 declared 
martial law. The National Guard marched on the Champ de Mars and eventually fired into the 
crowd, killing up to fifty people.
14
 
This event has inspired a great deal of insightful scholarship. Timothy Tackett analyzed it as a 
product of the swift turn in popular French attitude against Louis XVI following his flight to 
Varennes,
15
 whereas David Andress has noted how the subsequent political commentary tended 
to transform people into abstract concepts, thereby ignoring the plight of the individuals 
themselves.
16
 Building upon both of these ideas, I will show how the petitioners and the National 
Guard became symbolic tools in dueling narratives—thereby shaping competing conceptions of 
                                                             
11
 The National Assembly had nearly finalized the Constitution of 1791 when Louis XVI attempted to leave France, 
almost certainly to support a counter-revolutionary invasion, but he was caught in the town of Varennes and brought 
back to Paris. The Assembly, fearing France could not function without a King, absolved Louis so he could rule as a 
constitutional monarch in accordance with the new document. For further details see Timothy Tackett, When the 
King Took Flight, (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
 
12
 During Revolutionary festivals, French citizens often stood at these altars to swear oaths of loyalty to the nation.  
 
13
 Bailly was eventually guillotined for his role in the Champ de Mars massacre.  
 
14
 For a more detailed description of this event see David Andress, Massacre at the Champ de Mars: Popular 
Dissent and Political Culture in the French Revolution, (Suffolk and Rochester: The Boydell Press, 2000). 
 
15
 Tackett, When the King Took Flight. 
 
16
 Andress, Massacre at the Champ de Mars, 87. 
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the French nation. Later, I will show how these symbols recurred in the national debates of the 
nineteenth century. 
On the radical left, polemicists depicted the petitioners as symbols of the true French 
nation while offering scathing rebukes of General Lafayette. Immediately following the 
massacre, Jean Paul Marat’s popular newspaper L’Ami du Peuple (Friend of the People) carried 
the headline, “Atrocious massacre of peaceful citizens, women and children gathered on the 
Champ de Mars, their throats barbarously slit on the orders of the infernal Mottié
17
 
[Lafayette].”18 While depicting the petitioners as ideal citizens of revolutionary France, Marat 
also presents Lafayette as their antithesis. “Burning with impatience to begin carrying out the 
counterrevolution,” he wrote, “Mottié eagerly seized upon the occasion of the assembly of the 
friends of liberty who had come to the Champ de Mars.”19 Thus, Marat established a dichotomy 
between the petitioners who loved the revolutionary ideal of liberty and their “counter-
revolutionary” oppressors.  
Maximilien Robespierre feared (correctly) that a charismatic military leader would rise to 
power and co-opt the Revolution, and he therefore sustained the assault against Lafayette. A year 
after the massacre, Robespierre reminded the readers of his newspaper, Le Défenseur de la 
Constitution (Defender of the Constitution), that “the laws have not yet punished M. Lafayette’s 
                                                             
17
 Lafayette’s full name was Marie Jean Paul Joseph Roch Yves Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette. His leftist 
opponents referred to him as “Mottié,” a misspelling of the name he would have used had he not been an aristocrat. 
For more on the evolving public perceptions of Lafayette, see Lloyd Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds: Public 
Cultures and Personal Identities in an Age of Revolutions (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).  
 
18
 Jean Paul Marat, L’Ami du Peuple, No. 523, 19 July 1791, in Marat dit L’Ami du Peuple: Collection Complète du 
Journal, vol. XI (Tokyo : Society for Reproduction of Rare Books, 1967), 177. 
 
19
 Ibid., 177-8. 
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attacks against liberty.”20 Removed the petitioners as a symbolic intermediary, Robespierre 
accused Lafayette of striking at liberty itself. The human martyrs of the Champ de Mars 
remained a powerful rhetorical tool, however, and they figured heavily in a denunciation by 
Jean-Marie Collot d’Herbois which Robespierre reprinted following his brief introduction.  
Employing the same dichotomy of Lafayette versus the values of the French Revolution, 
Collot d’Herbois told the Jacobin Club, “it was with a cold and calculated cruelty that Lafayette 
gave [the National Guard] the signal to bloody the altar of the fatherland, to kill their unarmed 
friends, their women and their children…Ferocious man! You have made red with blood that 
sacred ground where free men had sworn union, federation, fraternity!”21 Here, Collot d’Herbois 
deliberately contrasted the “cruel” Lafayette with the united patriots of France, whom he 
associated with the ideals patrie, liberty, and fraternity. Robespierre himself seems to have made 
a conscious choice to portray Lafayette not only as a tyrant but also as antithetical to French 
values. A more explicit example is the passive-aggressive title of an open letter he published in 
1792, “Response of French citizen Robespierre to Monsieur La Fayette, general of the army.”22 
By assigning himself the new patriotic honorific of citoyen and referring to Lafayette in the old 
aristocratic manner, as Monsieur, Robespierre defined himself as a member of the French nation 
and Lafayette a dangerous an outsider.  
For their part, the National Guardsmen who served under Lafayette were minor 
characters in the radical leftist account. Louis-Marie Prudhomme’s newspaper, Révolutions de 
Paris described a brutal scene in which the National Guard hunted down petitioners attempting 
                                                             
20
 Maximilien Robespierre, Le Défenseur de la Constitution,  no. 9, 1792, in Œuvres Complète de Maximilien 
Robespierre, vol. IV, ed. Gustave Laurent (Paris : Société des Etudes Robespierristes, 1932), 262. 
21
 Jean-Marie Collot d’ Herbois, “Opinion de J. M. Collot—D’Herbois sur les coupables démarches du général 
Lafayette,” Le Défenseur de la Constitution, no. 9, 1792,  in Œuvres Complète de Maximilien Robespierre, vol. IV, 
ed. Gustave Laurent (Paris : Société des Etudes Robespierristes, 1932), 274. 
 
22
 Robespierre, Défenseur, no. 6, 1792,  in Œuvres vol. IV, 186. 
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to escape and even “thr[ew] their sabres at the legs of those they could not overtake.” After 
recounting this carnage, the paper argued that “despicable methods must have been used to bring 
the National Guard to this point!”23 Accounts such as these partially absolved the Guard by 
stripping it of agency. They suggested that nefarious elites must have turned the Guard against 
the people, who under normal circumstances would have been their allies.  
A political cartoon captured this point of view, portraying the National Guard as leashed 
turkeys tethered to the tail of Lafayette’s horse. The Commander addresses his Guardsmen while 
gesturing to a small crowd milling peacefully about the altar of the fatherland; he tells them, 
“remember, it will take courage to kill those people over there” (Figure 1). Although the 
cartoonist was not entirely sympathetic to the Guardsmen, he implied they were naïve pawns of 
the mastermind Lafayette. In fact, the cartoon probably depicted the National Guard as a force of 
turkeys because the French word for a male turkey, dindon, can also refer to a person who is 
easily deceived.  
A more specific conspiracy and wide-spread theory accused sinister counter-
revolutionaries of planting their own men under the altar of the fatherland so the petitioners 
would kill them, thus providing a pretext for a royalist coup. In line with this theory, Robespierre 
suggested the conspiracy aimed “to inflame the zeal of the National Guard.”24 Lafayette, of 
course, played a central role in the alleged plot. Marat claimed that the two men were disabled 
Guards, whom Lafayette had placed underneath the altar and supplied with gun power in order 
“to make them blow up the Champ de Mars while the friends of liberty were assembled there.”25 
                                                             
23
 Les Révolutions de Paris, No. 106, 16-23 July 1791, in The Press in the French Revolution, ed. J. Gilchrist and W. 
J. Murray (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1971), 162. 
 
24
 Robespierre, Défenseur, no. 6, 1792,  in Œuvres vol. IV, 165. 
 
25
 Marat, L’Ami du Peuple, No. 524, 27 July 1791, in Marat dit L’Ami du Peuple, vol. XI, 190. 
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The people, in Marat’s estimation, were entirely justified in killing these dangerous plants of the 
counter-revolutionary conspiracy.    
But whether supporters of the petitioners leveled specific charges or simply made vague 
accusations, they all stuck to the same general narrative: because of external influence from 
Lafayette, the Guard temporarily made war against the French nation. Though their Commander 
had betrayed France, the Guardsmen themselves were not permanently alien to their country. 
Collot d’Herbois took this argument to its logical conclusion, telling the people of France that by 
ridding themselves of the Commander of the Guard, they could rejuvenate their divided nation. 
“Punish Lafayette,” he wrote, “and the original links of our union will tighten again. A new 
federation will return us all to our first sentiments.”26 In other words, by eliminating the 
aristocratic enemy of revolutionary France, the Guard could reconcile itself with the people and 
thereby rejoin the nation. 
The rhetoric surrounding the Champ de Mars massacre relates to an argument Lynn Hunt has 
made about the Revolution as a whole; even as the Revolution grew more radical and more 
peripheral, its rhetoric and symbolism continued to appeal to universal values.
27
 In the polemics 
of 1791, leftist appeals to values such as liberty, equality, and fraternity—running parallel to 
accusations that their opponents attacked those values—led to narrower conceptions of who 
could be considered a true French citizen.  
Rightist and centrist narratives of the Champ de Mars did not establish the same 
connections to national symbols and ideals; because the nation in the eighteenth century was 
linked to the concept of popular sovereignty, nationalist rhetoric first developed in opposition to 
                                                             
26
 Collot d’Herbois, “Opinion,” in Défenseur, no. 9, 1792, in Œuvres de Robespierre, vol. IV, 274. 
 
27
 Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), 217. 
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monarchy. It is nonetheless important to understand the key archetypes of counter-revolutionary 
and moderate narratives, especially that of the destructive and seditious crowd, which went on to 
become a perennial figure in the discourse of the nationalist right. 
We can observe this image of the crowd in the Royalist paper L’Ami du Roi (Friend of 
the King), which was sympathetic to the National Guard and the Parisian municipal authorities. 
“The National Guard was menaced and insulted” on the Champ de Mars, the paper declared, at a 
site where “two murders had already been committed by villains.” Amid this dangerous 
situation, “Many National Guards were hit with stones” and “the troops could not hold back their 
indignation; they fired a salvo that entirely dissipated the seditious crowd.”28 Although the 
National Guard did not come across as particularly heroic in this account, as the petitioners did 
in the leftist narrative, L’Ami du Roi portrayed them as taking a logical course of action in order 
to uphold the public safety.   
By defending the National Guard, the paper portrayed the petitioners as the true villains, 
which in turn enabled it to critique the revolution in general. Noting the “striking similarity 
between these events and those that marked the first days of the revolution,” L’Ami du Roi 
criticized the crowds who had brought down the Bastille two years earlier. In both cases, it 
argued, “there were brigands who filled the capital with disorder; there were writings, incendiary 
motions, insurrections against authority were in full force, and victims immolated with a refined 
cruelty.” Raising the specter of “bloodied heads carried like trophies at the top of pikes,” the 
article went on to claim that the people of July 1791 were “more unpredictable...without a 
king.”29 This narrative performed a similar operation to that of the left. Like its Jacobin 
                                                             
28
 L’Ami du Roi, des Français, de l’ordre et surtout de la vérité, no. 200, 19 July 197, Gallica 
(ark:/12148/cb326916609), 798-9. 
 
29
 Ibid. 
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opponents, L’Ami Du Roi established a dichotomy between “the people” and the National Guard 
to argue for a particular version of France. The royalist narrative critiqued the “disorder” of the 
French Revolution and suggested that monarchist France had produced a stable, superior society.  
The constitutional monarchist Antoine Barnave offered a different variant of the pro-Guard 
narrative. A member of the Feuillant Club, Barnave had joined Lafayette and a group of center-
left politicians who split with the Jacobin Club over whether to reinstate Louis XVI’s powers 
after his attempted flight. Naturally, he was sympathetic to the National Guard’s cause. Barnave 
did not argue that the people were inherently anarchical without the king’s authority; instead, he 
blamed the Jacobins for stirring up disorder.
30
 Claiming Parisians largely favored reinstating the 
king, Barnave suggested that the Jacobins—who were “violently agitated”—had mobilized 
workers who lived outside the city. The Jacobins “took in a multitude of workers, who they 
called the nation, and invited them to revolt,” leading directly to “the unfortunate affair of the 
Champ de Mars.”31 With this accusation against the Jacobins, Barnave proved himself a 
conscious participant in the debate over national membership. He directly challenged the 
argument that the petitioners were “the nation” and instead insisted that they were trouble-
makers who were not true Parisians. This type of rhetoric mirrored leftist polemics that had 
denied citizenship to Lafayette.  
These rhetorical battles show how opposing ideologies constructed different meanings of 
French identity. Radicals like Marat associated citizenship with revolutionary activity and 
portrayed the French as a people locked in battle against a tyrannical class of aristocrats. 
Royalists, on the other hand, argued that France functioned only under a king’s rule and viewed 
                                                             
30
 It was actually a petition from the Cordeliers Club that the activists signed the day of the Champ de Mars 
massacre.  The Jacobin Club had considered endorsing it but ultimately decided not to. 
 
31
 Antione Barnave, Œuvres de Barnave, ed. Alphonse Bérenger (Paris : J. Chapelle et Guiller, 1843), Gallica 
(ark:/12148/bpt6k41685w), 135-6. 
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the revolutionary masses as a fundamental threat to French society. As L’Ami du Roi 
demonstrated, narratives of the massacre drew upon previously-established archetypes. The 
royalist paper employed the trope of the “bloodthirsty mob” in order to connect the petitioners to 
a pre-existing image, thereby reinforcing broader conclusions about the lawless nature of “the 
people.” Later generations would employ this strategy repeatedly as they put forth competing 
narratives of civil struggles in their own times.  
The Republic of Order and The Spirit of Revolution 
One such later struggle was the “June Days,” which ranks among the most controversial 
events in France’s perennial debate over revolutionary violence and national identity. Between 
June 23 and June 26, 1848, France’s newly-formed Second Republic put down a popular 
insurrection that was sparked when, after months of mounting tension, the National Assembly 
dissolved the National Workshops, an employment program for lower-class Parisians (formed 
after the February Revolution) and a hub of radical political activity. The Second Republic voted 
temporary dictatorial powers to General Louis-Eugène Cavaignac, who commanded the National 
and Mobile Guards as they smashed the insurgents’ barricades. 32 
Less than a week later, the pro-government newspaper L’Illustration ran a story praising 
a young Mobile Guardsman’s valor and, more importantly, his patriotic sentiment. According to 
the paper’s account, this sixteen-year-old soldier charged a barricade, seized the red flag planted 
atop it, and immediately collapsed. His fellow guardsmen “lifted him up, believing him dead or 
seriously injured, but he opened his eyes and told them it was nothing. ‘I felt so many emotions,’ 
                                                             
32
 For a detailed description of the June Days and its causes see Mark Traugott,  Armies of the Poor: Determinants 
of Working-Class Participation in the Parisian Insurrection of June 1848, 2
nd
 edition (New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 3-34. 
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he added ‘upon seeing that I was the master of the flag that I found myself ill.’”33 Like many 
battlefield narratives, this tale leaves much room for doubt. But whether a young man truly 
fainted upon capturing the red flag is less significant than the fact that L’Illustration deemed the 
story worthy of publication.  
The young soldier was an ideal symbol for Second Republic nationalism, which 
borrowed from the left and right of 1791, portraying Mobile Guards as both agents of order and 
champions of revolutionary ideals. The imagery of the tricolor dominated many of their accounts 
because it associated the soldiers of the Second Republic with the French Revolution while also 
allowing government sympathizers to cast the insurgents, with their red flag, as alien enemies. 
The defenders of the nascent republic considered this symbolism important enough to award the 
Cross of Honor to several soldiers who had seized red flags from the barricades of Foubourg St. 
Antoine.
34
 
It also allowed a young woman named Victorine Charlemagne to make herself into a 
Second Republic folk hero. She portrayed herself as a young cantinière who had courageously 
charged to the top of barricade and stolen a flag from her enemy’s hands. 35 Historians have cast 
serious doubt on her story, but she inspired several songs and illustrations in which she often 
resembled a conservatively dressed version of Marianne.
36
 In one representative example (Figure 
2), Victorine wields the tricolor flag’s pole as a weapon, clashing it against an insurgent’s rifle. 
She strikes a heroic, resolute pose while the insurgent—a wild-looking man with a contorted 
                                                             
33 L’Illustration, no. 279-280, 1-8 July 1848, 283. 
34 “Gardes Mobiles,” L’Illustration, no. 279-280, 1-8 July 1848, 283. 
 
35
 Cantinières were female auxiliaries to French army units. They sold food, drink, and laundry services to the 
soldiers in addition to caring for the wounded and often fighting alongside the men. See Thomas Cardoza, Intrepid 
Women : Cantinières and Vivandières of the French Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
 
36
 Thomas Cardoza notes that everything from her name to the wildly unrealistic details of her story arouse 
suspicion. Ibid., 156-7. 
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face—is clearly frightened and appears to be on the verge of toppling backward. She does not 
need to look at her opponent in order to overcome him, as if the tricolor has imbued her with a 
mystical strength. Bullet holes riddle her flag, but it nonetheless flies triumphantly above the 
barricade, symbolizing a republic that had emerged victorious from a potentially fatal assault. 
The official statements of the Second Republic mirrored this imagery, tying its soldiers 
and its defense of order to historically poignant nationalist rhetoric—in particular, the ideals of 
liberté, egalité, fraternité. When the tide of war turned against the barricades, General Cavaignac 
announced, “the cause of order and the true Republic triumphs.” He then described the unity and 
fraternity with which France fought the insurgents and concluded, “all of France beats with one 
heart and aspires to the same goal, the Republic and order.”37 By implication, Cavaignac 
excluded those who did not aspire to “order” from his conception of “all of France.” Similarly, a 
proclamation of the National Assembly accused the insurrection of “striking at the heart” of 
“family, institution, liberty, patrie…under the blows of these new barbarians, the civilization of 
the nineteenth century was in danger of perishing.”38 By associating “liberty” and “patrie” with 
“institutions” and “civilization,” the government of the Second Republic integrated its value of 
“defending order” into the already-established ideals of the French nation. 
To emphasize the fraternité between its citizens, the Second Republic narrative also 
featured the provincial National Guard’s support for their cause. Alexis de Tocqueville, who then 
served as a deputy to the National Assembly, wrote of the volunteers who traveled from the 
countryside, “these men belonged without distinction to all the classes of society; among them 
there were many peasants, many bourgeois, many great landowners and nobles, all mixed 
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together in the same ranks.” While painting this picture of national unity, Tocqueville carefully 
omitted from his list (ostensibly of “all classes of society”) any reference to the urban proletariat. 
Lest we wonder if the omission was accidental, Tocqueville continued, “the insurgents were 
receiving no fresh forces, and we, we had all of France for reserves.”39 L’Illustration similarly 
praised “the enthusiasm that animated these defenders of order and liberty that the provinces had 
sent us,” and argued that these reinforcements had proved “the Republic was established upon an 
indestructible base [because] it is in seeing them that one can understand how the word fraternity 
that the Republic inscribed on her banner is far from devoid of meaning.”40 Both the paper and 
Tocqueville connected the National Guard to the French revolutionary principles of liberty and 
fraternity. In doing so, they suggested by suppressing the June Days uprising, the French armed 
forces demonstrated their commitment to the French nation’s enduring values. 
Because a soldier is only as brave as the enemy is frightening, it was not enough for the 
Second Republic to portray the Guard as the heroic embodiment of the nation; they also needed 
to present the rebels of the June Days as an existential threat to their version of French 
civilization. L’Illustration alluded to a bleak alternative—a France in which the revolt had 
succeeded. The paper described some imprisoned insurgents as “true soldiers of riot, necessary 
agents of all insurrections past and future…Victors, they would have begun again tomorrow 
against their own comrades. Vanquished, they resigned themselves with fatalism and 
carelessness.”41 The workers had a natural inclination to revolt against authority, the paper 
suggested. Had they succeeded, they would have formed a new authority, which the “true 
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soldiers of riot” would have subsequently attacked, thus perpetuating France’s spiral into utter 
disorder. Suppressing the uprising had therefore prevented the nation—and civilization in 
general—from continuing on that fatal road toward anarchy.     
Tocqueville later wrote that upon the outbreak of street fighting, Paris reminded him “of 
some city of antiquity, in which the bourgeois
42
 defend their walls as heroes, because they know 
that if the city falls, they themselves will be dragged into slavery.” The defense against the 
insurgents thus rescued civilization, but even further, it aided society’s future progress. 
Tocqueville made this clear when he argued that the battle against the insurgents was necessary 
because, at least for the moment it had “delivered the nation from the oppression of the workers 
of Paris and put it back in possession of itself.”43 In this view, Parisian workers were alien to the 
nation, and their influence on France was akin to foreign oppression. Tocqueville characterized 
“France” and the workers in a way that inverted the language that French republicans of 1792 
had employed against the crown;
44
 only in overthrowing the alien force of the urban working 
class could the French nation—as Tocqueville conceived of it—regain the freedom to exercise 
its sovereignty.    
Victor Hugo’s description of “the people” contrasted starkly with Tocqueville’s, yet he 
too presented the suppression of the June Days as necessary to ensure the freedom of the French 
nation. As a republican deputy to the National Assembly, Hugo placed an intriguing twist upon 
the government’s dominant narrative by asserting that “the Faubourgs of Paris…are heroes even 
                                                             
42
 I left the word “bourgeois” untranslated because it contains a revealing double-meaning. On the surface, 
Tocqueville meant “townspeople” or “citizens.” However, given his desire characterize the Parisian proletariat as 
alien to the nation, he likely intended this description of saviors of an archetypal ancient city to mirror the bourgeois 
class he praised in his own time. 
 
43
 Tocqueville, Souvenirs, 234, 255-6. 
 
44
 In debates surrounding the trial of King Louis XVI in 1792, Jacobins argued that a king could not be a true citizen 
of the nation.  
 
 
18 
 
when they err.” In The History of a Crime,45 he defended the Second Republic’s response to the 
June Days, arguing that because of “a bad definition of socialism,” the workers “rose in June, 
1848, against the Assembly elected by themselves, against universal suffrage, against their own 
vote.”46 Hugo expanded upon these seemingly contradictory ideas—that the people were both 
heroic and wrong—in Les Misérables.47  
Although the climactic action of Les Misérables takes place in 1832, Hugo opened “Jean 
Valjean Book 1” by describing with reverence the two great barricades of June 1848. He did not 
attempt to distance the insurgents from France’s revolutionary past, but he also made clear that 
they had acted in opposition to the French nation and values. 
It sometimes happens that, even against principles, even against liberty, equality, and 
fraternity, even against universal suffrage, even against the government of all by all, from 
the depths of its anguish, of its discouragements, of its destitution, of its fevers, of its 
distresses, of its miasmas, of its ignorance, of its darkness, that that great embodiment of 
desperation, the rabble, protests, and that the populace gives battle to the people.
48
  
 
Hugo portrayed the insurgent workers as enemies of the French nation only in the moment of 
insurrection; they attacked the Republic, the revolutionary values of liberté, egalité, fraternité—
and even themselves. In representing the short-lived uprising as a tragic misunderstanding by 
heroic but ultimately self-defeating insurgents, he allowed “the people” to reclaim their place in 
a national, revolutionary narrative. Yet his account of the specific moment of June 1848 
positioned the people against the Second Republic, which he connected to the key values of that 
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revolutionary history. Despite Hugo’s nuanced position toward the people, the broad strokes of 
his narrative lined up with those of Cavaignac’s. The government’s defenders may have offered 
slight variations on which groups were true members of the nation. Nonetheless, they all agreed 
that the uprising threated French republican civilization, and therefore suppressing it was a 
national imperative.  
Leftist supporters of the June Days accepted neither the Second Republic’s 
characterization of the combatants nor its definition of the French nation. Rejecting the notion 
that the Second Republic had rescued civilization from the agents of disorder, Karl Marx wrote 
that the Party of Order defined “public safety” as “the safety of the bourgeoisie.”49 Delphine de 
Girardin presented her own ironic version of the Second Republic narrative and similarly argued 
that the June Days uprising was a battle over property. In other respects, however, their 
narratives—and with them, their conceptions of identity—diverged to a greater extent than their 
pro-government opponents.  
Karl Marx’s rhetoric intersected with the history of fractured French nationalism in two 
significant ways. First, although it differed in certain respects from the French nationalist left of 
1848, Communard sympathizers would succeed in integrating it into the radical French 
narratives of 1871. Second, it established yet another imagined community that competed for 
legitimacy within France.
50
 Marx’s attacks on the Second Republic notion of “order” exemplify 
the later contribution. “Order! Shouts Cavaignac,” he wrote, “the brutal echo of the French 
National Assembly and of the republican bourgeoisie. Order! Thundered his grape-shot, as it 
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ripped up the body of the proletariat.”51 With this statement, Marx used both sides of the 
conflicts as stand-ins for an entire class. Just as the Second Republic represented its soldiers as 
“all of France,” Marx implied that the rebels were “the proletariat” as a whole and defined their 
enemies as simply “the bourgeoisie.” In employing this nationalist-style binary, Marx sought to 
construct an “imagined community” in Benedict Anderson’s conception of the phrase. Marx 
defined his community on the basis of class: an international society of proletarians who would 
one day overthrow the capitalist order. Like the members of an imagined national community, 
the workers who formed this international union would share a mental conception of their 
community despite having no physical interaction with the vast majority of their comrades.
52
  
As he portrayed the June Days insurgents as proletarian martyrs, Marx also took care to 
portray the workers’ enemies as alien to their class. He referred to the National Guard as “the 
bourgeoisie in different grades” and argued that the Mobile Guard “belonged for the most part to 
the lumpenproletariat...a recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the 
crumbs of society.”53 In reality, the Mobile Guard’s socioeconomic makeup reflected that of the 
insurgent workers,
54
 so we can view Marx’s insistence that they were not truly proletarians as his 
own version of a long-running tactic that denied national membership or identity to those who 
acted against their interests. It is analogous to Marat and Robespierre declaring Lafayette a 
foreigner.   
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The French socialist Louis Blanc, the deputy who had first put forth the idea of the 
National Workshops, presented a narrative that even more closely mirrors that of the radical left 
following the Champ de Mars massacre. Not only did he blame Cavaignac for acts of brutal 
repression and connect the insurgent workers with symbols of the nation, Blanc also refrained 
from presenting the Guard as entirely irreconcilable with the nation. He disagreed with Marx on 
the demographic makeup of the mobile guard, arguing that they were true proletarians, “but, 
through a lamentable combination of circumstances, they fell...into the hands of the enemies of 
the Republic, who contrived...to turn them into destroyers of their own class and their own 
cause.” While he revived the trope of the shadowy conspiracy, which polemicists like Marat had 
relied on so heavily in 1791, Blanc demonstrated even more sympathy for combatants of the 
Mobile Guard, lamenting the fact that “the blood of countrymen and fellow-citizens was flowing 
in disastrous rivalry.”55  
Blanc thus included both the insurgents and Mobile Guardsman in his definition of 
French identity, but made some exclusions as well. In his lengthy discussion of the red flag, 
Blanc defended his proposal to declare it the official flag of the Second Republic. In doing so, he 
alluded to many of the debates surrounding the June Days. Blanc argued that “the people” 
adopted the red flag during the February Revolution because “they knew...that white meant 
kingly power, and that red had long been the national colour. In their eyes the prestige of the 
tricoloured flag had been irrevocably broken” by “seventeen years of corrupt policy” under 
Louis Philippe.
56
 Using this line of thought, he aligned those who fought under the red flag (the 
“national color”) with true France, whereas those who fought under the tricolor represented a 
corrupted France, the legacy of recent years of a bad, monarchical government.   
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Reaching even further back in history, Blanc directly referenced the Champ de Mars 
massacre. He pointed out that the red flag was initially raised to warn the people that the 
government had declared martial law and argued that the Parisian authorities had not correctly 
observed this formality on July 17. If they had, “the blood of the people would not have been 
shed at all; as those gathered at the Champ de Mars were unarmed, actuated by no seditious 
feelings or warlike intentions, and quite disposed to withdraw, if warned in time.” Blanc thus 
assigned the petitioners a more peaceful character than Marat’s account of a patriotic crowd 
which had rightfully killed two “spies” discovered in their midst, a tweak to the narrative of 1791 
that better served Blanc’s sympathetic description of the red flag and workers of 1848. In an 
implied comparison to the June Days, he claimed that in the aftermath of the February 
Revolution “not a drop of blood was shed, owing to the conduct of the sanguinary partisans of 
the red flag, then in complete possession of the street; the houses of the rich were guarded by the 
poor, and the men in rags stood as sentinels at the gates of their calumniators.”57 By 
appropriating and slightly altering leftist narratives of the Champ de Mars massacre, Blanc 
assigned historical significance to the good people of the “uncorrupted” France who fought 
under the red flag, arguing that they had been peaceful throughout the generations. To the 
people’s opponents, on the other hand, he attributed a long history of hypocrisy and repression.   
It should be noted that some narratives of the June Days did not put forward explicit 
interpretations of French nationalism. Many writers criticized the Second Republic without 
accepting that the insurgents of the June Days were the embodiment of either their country or the 
workers’ international. The author and playwright Delphine de Girardin was one example of a 
commentator who accepted certain characterizations from multiple narratives, but on the whole 
rejected them all. A political leftist who claimed adherence to no political party, Girardin became 
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a harsh critic of Cavaignac. The General, incidentally, had ordered the arrest of her husband 
Emile de Girardin, editor of the leftist publication La Presse (a paper to which Delphine herself 
was also a contributor).  
Perhaps her personal experience explains why she directed the bulk of her criticism at the 
Second Republic and also challenged its claim that it had suppressed the June Days in order to 
rescue French civilization. In a series of letters and diaries, Chroniques Parisiennes, she wrote, 
“in this glorious France…blood flows in great waves…and it is not for the defense of a menaced 
nationality.” Instead, she argued, “blood flows in the valiant country of France because of the 
attack on, and the defense of, property.”58 Here she agreed with Marx and Blanc that the 
bourgeoisie wished to put down the revolt in order to preserve a system that defended their 
material interests. Nonetheless, as we can infer from her double attack on those who fought for 
and against property, Girardin cast blame on the workers as well.  
She endowed this critique with a historical dimension and translated her views on the June Days 
into a statement about civil conflict throughout French history. Girardin opened this line of 
argument by identifying the two parties of 1848: 
The party of those who want to keep, 
The party of those who want to take. 
The party of the egoists, 
The party of the envious. 
 
Each of these parties, in Girardin’s estimation, employed specific words that guided their every 
action and revealed their culpability for violence of the June Days. The first party’s refrain was 
“shoot, shoot!” and second’s was “guillotine, guillotine!”59 In characterizing the warring parties 
with these particular words, she created a certain parallel between their violent natures and called 
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on her readers to reject them both. She also evoked painful historical memories of armed assaults 
on barricades and the Terror of 1793-1794. Her argument employed characterizations that 
multiple forms of French nationalism had put forward, yet it did so in a way that called on her 
audience to be skeptical of French nationalism in general.  
Gustave Flaubert’s famous novel L’Education Sentimentale, first published in 1869, encouraged 
a similar brand of skepticism. As the main character, Frédéric, learned of the June Days, he 
expressed sympathy for the insurgents while taking issue with the National Guard’s brutality. 
The scene in which Frédéric learned how the Guardsman Dussardier was injured presents a 
telling example. “At the top of a barricade in the rue Lafayette, a young urchin wrapped in a 
tricolor flag cried out to the National Guard, ‘are you going to fire on your brothers!’” In 
response, Dussardier kicks the boy and takes his flag.
60
 Here, Flaubert identified the insurgent 
with the symbol of France while accusing the National Guard of committing violence against the 
boy, the tricolor, and the ideal of fraternity. Because he referenced the events of the first French 
Revolution throughout L’Education Sentimentale, Flaubert probably intended this scene’s 
setting—the rue Lafayette—to evoke the Champ de Mars massacre. This allusion gave historical 
depth to his implication that republican France tended to violate its own ideals.      
Yet Flaubert also condemned the violence of left wing radicals. Near the end of the 
novel, Frédéric runs into his old friend Deslauriers, who recounts the frustration he faced while 
working as a commissioner for the Second Republic. “As he preached fraternity to the 
conservatives and respect of law to the socialists,” Flaubert wrote, “the former took shots at him 
and the later brought a rope to string him up.”61 Like Girardin, Flaubert rejected both French 
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traditions as inherently violent. To do so, he employed the leftist critique that portrayed the right 
as brutally repressive and then used the rightist critique of the left as the enemy of law and order. 
Both Flaubert and Girardin (like Blanc and Marx) connected the combatants of 1848 to long-
running historical traditions. Although the two authors took issue with multiple conceptions of 
the nation, they both reproduced those conceptions for their readers, providing more literary 
material for polemicists to draw upon in future debates.    
A People Massacred, A Civilization Destroyed 
Above the main entrance to the Hôtel de Ville, a plaque reads, “In this place on 4 
September, 1870, the people of Paris proclaimed a republic.” It refers to a popular insurrection 
which ousted Napoleon III (who the Prussians had captured during the Battle of Sedan) and 
established a provisional Government of National Defense. The plaque neglects to mention that 
less than six months later, the people of Paris overthrew that republic and proclaimed a 
Commune.
62
 The defeated authorities regrouped at Versailles, held elections throughout the 
provinces, and declared themselves the legitimate government of France. The Paris Commune 
called on cities everywhere to follow its example and throw off national authorities in order to 
establish progressive municipal republics; it cast itself not only as the legitimate government of 
Paris, but also as the forerunner of a new world order. In 1871, the Republic of Order and Social 
Republic were more than abstract concepts. For approximately ten weeks, they were distinct 
political entities, with separate governments and separate armies existing side-by-side.  
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Then, in the final week of May, the Versailles Government annihilated the Commune, killing up 
to 35,000 people in the process.
63
 The left reacted with shock and outrage, accusing their 
opponents of calculated, wholescale slaughter. They evoked memories of June 1848, portraying 
the Bloody Week as an infinitely more terrible June, in order to emphasize the brutality of the 
Versailles government. Yet despite—or perhaps because of—the crippling nature of their defeat, 
Communard sympathizers also put forth a message of hope. In their view, the Commune 
embodied the revolutionary spirit of the French nation, and it actively advanced the revolution’s 
progress. 
The leftist narrative of 1871 was more unified than that of 1848, possibly because the 
Commune’s official rhetoric had encouraged its members to identify both with the French nation 
and the international working-class struggle. In one representative example, the Commune’s 
Committee of Public Safety issued a proclamation calling upon the people of Paris to take up 
arms against the Versaillais invaders. It instructed those who “want to live free in a free and 
egalitarian France” to prevent the city from falling into “the pitiless hands of the reactionaries 
and clericals of Versailles” who “delivered France to the Prussians and whom we will make pay 
for their treasons.” Employing the same formula the Second Republic had used in 1848, the 
Committee pitted the historical French republican values of liberty and equality against the 
“traitors” of the Versailles government, whose ideals were antithetical to those of the free nation. 
But then the Committee went further, referring to France as the “mother of all popular 
revolutions, permanent home to the ideas of justice and solidarity that must be and will be the 
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laws of the world.”64 Beyond presenting itself as the true France, the Commune thus claimed to 
be the forerunner of a new world order.  
This idea did not die with the Commune. Karl Marx famously wrote that “working men’s 
Paris, with its Commune, will be forever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society. 
Its martyrs are enshrined in the great heart of the working class.”65 He continued to add historical 
depth to his notion of the workers’ international, enshrining new heroes into the canon of his 
class-based imagined community. In this way, even the failed uprisings of the June Days and the 
Paris Commune expanded the narrative of communist history and raised expectations for its 
future. But Marx was not the only leftist who embraced a narrative of progress. Louise Michel, a 
leading Communard (a radical socialist who was never a member of the communist-led Union 
des Femmes) adopted a similar outlook. In her memoirs, which she dedicated to freedom fighters 
around the world, Michel predicted that her struggle would inspire a new generation. “As we 
kept armed vigil,” she wrote, recalling her days at the barricades, “we liked to speak of battles 
for liberty. So too at the present hour, awaiting a new spring, we will speak of the days of the 
Commune…from the slaughter of 71 to a rising dawn.”66 While acknowledging the importance 
of previous revolutionary narratives to the combatants of 1871, Michel carved out a new space 
for her fellow Communards. 
Leftists also expanded upon the other side of the progressive/reactionary dichotomy that the 
Commune’s official rhetoric had established; Versailles was the mortal enemy of the social 
republic, the latest link in a long chain of tyrants who used military force to suppress the 
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democratic spirit. Versailles chief Adolphe Thiers “wanted only one thing,” said the exiled 
Communard André Léo in September 1871, “the extermination of the democrats and the 
crushing defeat of Paris… After this new, much more terrible June, there was a new suppression 
of the word Republic, a new restauration.”67 In demonizing Thiers, she connected both the June 
Days and the massacre of the Commune to the post-1815 restoration, thereby denying the 
republican credentials that the government of 1848 had so rigorously attempted to carve into 
cultural memory.   
Decades later, the brutalities of 1848 and 1871 remained linked in cultural memory, as 
evidenced by Maximilien Luce’s painting, A Street in Paris in May 1871 (Figure 3). Completed 
between 1903 and 1905, this work depicts four male Communards lying dead in the street. An 
unarmed woman’s body rests next to the deceased men, clearly distinguished by her white and 
purple clothing, in contrast to the blue uniforms of the Fédérés. She attests to their innocence, as 
does the soft color palate, while the poses of the dead suggest a sense of tragic calm. Luce’s 
work bears a great resemblance to Ernest Meissonier’s The Barricade, rue de la Morellerie 
(Figure 4) which portrays the aftermath of a street battle in the June Days of 1848. Meissonier, 
too, represents dead bodies behind a pile of cobblestones. Both paintings approach the street 
from roughly the same angle, and both display intact façades with boarded windows in the 
background. Meissonier’s buildings are a dreary brown mixed with some orange and blue, and 
his bodies are contorted into more unnatural shapes, suggesting violent deaths. Luce recalls this 
brutality while also eliciting sympathy for the defeated Communards. By choosing to base A 
Street In Paris on the earlier Barricade, he projects his portrayal of innocence onto the dead of 
1848 while also linking the savagery of the repression in 1871 to the repressive violence of the 
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June Days. The Parisian workers of different generations were thus represented as the same 
characters in an ongoing historical narrative of uprising and oppression. 
Once again, the left denied both agency and national membership to the individual 
soldiers who fought against the workers. The National Guards who had joined the March 
revolution became known as Fédérés, a word that Communard supporters used interchangeably 
with “the people.” They were no longer “the bourgeoisie in different grades” or the 
lumpenproletariat, as Marx had portrayed the National and Mobile Guard following the June 
Days of 1848. Marx himself wrote that the initial revolution of March 1871 was only successful 
because Paris “had got rid of the army, and replaced it by a National Guard, the bulk of which 
consisted of working men.”68 Before its final destruction, the Commune extended the Versailles 
troops an opportunity to similarly become members of its imagined community. In a May 24 
proclamation to the soldiers of Versailles, it wrote, “do not abandon the cause of the Workers! 
Do as your brothers did on March 18! Unite with the People, of which you are part! Let the 
aristocrats, the privileged, the hangmen of humanity defend themselves.”69 After the Versaillais 
proceeded to massacre the Communards, however, sympathizers of the defeated movement no 
longer considered the Versailles soldiers as part of “the people.”  
Recalling the mass executions at Père-Lachaise cemetery, Frederick Engels described the 
Wall of the Fédérés as “a mute but eloquent testimony to the frenzy of which the ruling class is 
capable as soon as the working class decides to stand up for its rights.”70 The soldiers who 
carried out these executions, Engels implied, were part of the “ruling class,” or at the very least 
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part of its machinery. Marx later distinguished the Versailles soldiers from the proletariat, 
claiming that their ranks consisted at first of “a handful of Chouans fighting under a white flag, 
every one of them wearing on his breast the heart of Jesus in white cloth, and shouting ‘Vive le 
roi!’” This allusion to the Vendée region’s revolt against the First Republic portrayed the 
Versaillais as an unevolved people still living in a pre-industrial world—a marked contrast with 
Marx’s representation of the urban proletariat.  
In leftist imagery of the bloody week, the Versaillais appear as peripheral, emotionally 
detached figures that lack individual autonomy. Ernest Pichio’s ironically titled painting, The 
Triumph of Order, portrays mass executions against the Wall of the Fédérés (Figure 5). He 
foregrounds the Communards, whose arched backs and dramatic gestures represent them as 
tragic, romantic figures. Most of the soldiers carrying out the execution are indistinct; they blur 
together with their cannons. The two soldiers that appear more clearly stand in the shadows, their 
faces obscured. They maintain their straight posture as one casually shoots a Fédéré. In contrast 
to the suffering Communards, Pichio’s Versaillais betray no hint of emotion. Similarly, the firing 
squad in Edouard Manet’s famous lithograph The Barricade (Figure 6) is composed of faceless 
soldiers, all roughly the same height and standing with similar postures. Toward the left side of 
the picture, they seem to blend together, appearing less as individual people than as an emanation 
of government force.  
While Communard sympathizers decried the massacre of a people, the Versailles Government 
used well-established narrative traditions to accuse its opponents of destroying a civilization. 
Building upon the Second Republic’s theme of “order,” the right of 1871 represented the burning 
of Paris as a metaphor for the murder of the city, the nation, or French civilization as a whole. 
Even before the Commune was fully suppressed, the destruction of Paris became an essential 
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rhetorical touchstone for the Versailles government. On May 24, provisional chief executive 
Adolphe Thiers condemned the burnings as “odious acts, abominable, without precedent in 
history…it was nothing but the hopeless act of villains who pretended for a moment to dominate 
France. It was in retreat that they set the fire.”71 His allies echoed this message, creating 
sensationalistic images that decried the destruction of Parisian landmarks while also representing 
the Commune as the enemy of the French nation. 
A little more than a month after the end of the Bloody Week, the novelist and journalist 
Louis Énault produced an illustrated anti-Communard history entitled Paris Brûlé Par La 
Commune. Mirroring Thiers, he wrote, “the city that one has so often called the flame of the 
world burned like a torch; – no doubt to die as she had lived.”72 In the cover art (Figure 7), a 
woman is tied to a stake, and flames leap around her while the city burns. Her shield contains the 
fleurs de Lys and ship that make up the Parisian coat of arms, which dates back to the late 
medieval era. She is an allegory for Paris, while the instrument of her execution—a stake topped 
with a liberty cap—represents the Commune.  
In addition to constructing feminine metaphors of victimhood, the right of 1871 also 
depicted Communard women as the embodiment of a vicious underclass. Drawing for the 
conservative periodical Le Monde Illustré, Frédéric Lix helped popularize the trope of the 
pétroleuse; according to a widespread conservative myth, Communard women had hidden 
stockpiles of gasoline around Paris, which they used to programmatically burn the city when it 
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became evident that they Commune would fall.
73
 In “The Arsonists” (Figure 8), Lix depicted 
three such women, all stereotypically ugly and wearing cruel expressions, pouring petrol onto a 
building. The accompanying article claims that “Paris, like Rome and Alexandria, had been 
devoted to the arsonists…Civil war and conflagration! Such was the program of the Paris 
Commune.”74 Beyond blaming the Commune for the murder of Paris, Le Monde Illustré 
assigned it sole culpability for the civil war. Bertall, a prolific engraver and caricaturist, 
presented similar themes in his book of lithographs, Les Communeux, 1871: Types, caractères, 
costumes. In his plate la Barricade (Figure 9), a woman raises the flag of the Commune with one 
arm and holding a flaming torch at her side with the other. Like Lix’s pétroleuses, the woman is 
unattractive. She has a lined face, a disproportionately large mouth, and wild hair that 
matches the form of the smoke clouds rising behind her. Both her torch and the homes behind the 
barricade burn a shade of red that matches the color of the Commune’s flag. Thus, she becomes a 
metaphor for the Commune’s destructive nature. 
Although individual women rarely figured into nationalist narratives of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, they often played large symbolic roles. As we have seen, the Second 
Republic transformed cantinières into allegories of the nation while the left of 1791 referenced 
female victims to attest to the petitioners’ innocence. The archetype of the wild woman who had 
abandoned her feminine nature also had a long history in counter-revolutionary discourse. She 
appeared with particular intensity following the Women’s March to Versailles, the revolutionary 
journée that forced the royal family to relocate to Paris in October 1789. In one contemporary 
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lithograph (Figure 10), the only conventionally attractive woman in the crowd is a hostage. She 
wears aristocratic clothing, and in contrast to the others, she has a slim waistline and large hips. 
The marchers drag her along as she looks back mournfully. One of the figures pulling the cannon 
appears to be a man; he wears a dress but has a masculine face and the shading around his cheeks 
suggests a beard. His presence suggests that the women around him have all become male 
through their actions, even if they wear the outer veneer of female bodies. The trope of the 
masculine radical woman was widespread throughout Europe, as evidenced by Edmund Burke’s 
portrayal of the Women’s March to Versailles. Burke condemned “the furies of hell in the 
abused shape of the vilest of women” who had ensured that the world would never again “behold 
that generous loyalty to rank and sex…that subordination of the heart which kept alive, even in 
servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom.”75  
If female revolutionaries had killed the feminine ideal in 1789, the women of the 
Commune managed to murder it again in 1871. The same trope of “unnaturally” masculine 
women is evident in Bertall’s76 rendering of the Pétroleuses (Figure 11). This lithograph portrays 
two women, one in her senior years and the other middle-aged, carrying cans of petrol and 
walking away from a burning house. Behind them stands a boy who had presumably lived 
there.
77
 Here, we see two generations of women abandoning their “feminine duty” to care for the 
next. While Bertall accused the women of the Commune of failing as mothers, the writer 
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Augustine Alphonsine Malvina Blanchecotte wove a metaphor of Paris as an unfaithful wife.
78
 In 
a preface to her journals written during the Commune, which she originally published in 1872, 
she bemoaned that “Paris is ceasing to peacefully be the legitimate spouse of France, [she] will 
become…the other! The fascinating, provocative, alluring, irresistible mistress...Adventurers 
from around the world will come to take up residence.”79 
For Blachecotte, this metaphor of a wife’s betrayal mirrored the Commune’s betrayal of France. 
She wrote glowingly of the patriotic sentiment within Paris during the Franco-Prussian War, but 
then argued that what began as a “patriotic fever during the siege” transformed into social unrest 
and “insanity” under the Commune. Blanchecotte was more explicit than many of her rightist 
contemporaries in drawing the connection between Communard violence and the destruction of 
France’s revolutionary values. In a journal entry on May 23, she sarcastically invoked the motto 
commonly inscribed on 19
th
 century tricolors. “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity or death! In effect, 
there is neither liberty, nor equality, nor fraternity in a state of riot [sous l’émeute]; there is only 
death, nothing but death!” The Commune had realized this motto, she implied, only because they 
chose death over liberty, equality, and fraternity.
80
 
Blanchecotte’s appeal to the ideals of republican France is striking for its relative absence 
in the rightist rhetoric of 1871. Aside from brief references to the tricolor flag (which had also 
been the symbol of Napoleonic France) flying above Paris once more, Adolphe Thiers avoided 
the republican imagery upon which Cavaignac had relied. Because the Third Republic would not 
be officially established until 1875, Thiers and his supporters may have felt that in the immediate 
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aftermath of the Commune’s destruction, the rhetoric of order and “French civilization” in 
general would resonate more effectively. Thiers himself—having served the July Monarch, 
Second Republic, and Second Empire—had no ideological commitment to a specific form of 
government. Perhaps that is why he lacked an appreciation for the rhetorical subtleties of French 
republican discourse. Whereas Cavaignac had openly challenged the image of soldiers as 
oppressors, Thiers’s May 24 speech characterized the army as “a generous and noble means of 
repression.” Earlier, he had missed an opportunity to portray his opponents as foreigners when he 
praised the Versaillais for completing the “painful” task of “combatting Frenchmen on French 
soil.” The Bonapartist deputy Adrien Joseph Prax-Paris quickly interjected, shouting that the 
Communard forces “are not [composed] of Frenchmen!”81   
The Versailles Government never managed to portray the soldiers who repressed the 
Commune as embodiments of the French nation. They were, however, able to draw upon Second 
Republic tropes in order to characterize the Communards as assassins of French civilization. 
Later, they embarked upon a cultural campaign to pre-date the Third Republic to 1870. The 
plaque above the Hôtel de Ville, affixed above the entrance in 1920, glorifies the revolution of 
September 4, 1870 in order to suggest a continuity between the Government of National 
Defense, the Versailles Government, and the Third Republic. Inscriptions under the Arc de 
Triomphe and in the Place de la République similarly celebrate 1870 as the birth of the Third 
Republic; these monuments send an implicit message—the Government of National Defense was 
never legitimately overthrown and Versailles was, throughout the episode of the Paris Commune, 
the true government of France. 
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Conclusion 
 
The struggle for the memory of 1871 is just one example of the fractured nature of 
French nationalism. Polemical portrayals of “the people” and the armed forces following three 
divisive revolutionary events demonstrate that French national identity did not evolve as one 
coherent entity but rather branched out in various, contradictory directions. Following the Champ 
de Mars Massacre, the June Days, and the fall of the Paris Commune, competing ideological 
camps employed national symbolism to suit their own perspectives and in so doing, they put 
forward different versions of the nation. In 1848, many Second Republic supporters combined 
the ideals of the First Republic with the royalist emphasis on order and portrayed those who 
disrupted that order as outsiders, just as Barnave had represented the petitioners of 1791. Their 
opponents, meanwhile, took issue with the notion that the Second Republic represented all of 
France. Marx and Girardin (mirroring Marat’s earlier arguments about Lafayette) accused 
Cavaignac of cutting down the people for the benefit of an elite class, and Louis Blanc aligned 
the government of 1848 with the “corrupted” France of Louis Phillipe and the repressors of the 
Champ de Mars.   
Divisions over revolt, suppression, and membership in the nation calcified during the 
Paris Commune. The Versailles government uncoupled the concept of order from the rightest 
conception of republican ideals and instead attached it to an older form of French “civilization.” 
By vilifying the Communards as destroyers of this civilization’s symbols, architecture, and 
gender roles, supporters of the Versailles government presented the Commune as the enemy of 
France. For the Communards, by contrast, the French people were the historical leaders of social 
revolution. On this basis, leftist nationalists and the leaders of the International were able to 
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agree on a broad narrative that both integrated the Commune into the canon of great French 
revolutions and cast its martyrs as the forerunner of a new proletarian-led world.  
As contemporaries of the commune invoked memories, symbols, and archetypes of 1848 and 
1791 in order to characterize the Communards and the Versaillais, the Commune’s memory 
became fodder for future national debates. Despite the Third Republic’s initial attempts to censor 
this bloody historical episode, leftists continued to put forth their narratives of the Commune and 
to gather at the Wall of the Fédérés in honor of the lost heroes of the social republic. As 
evidenced by papers produced for the Commune’s centennial in 1971, rightists still invoked the 
narrative of a civilization destroyed; they revived the archetype of the rabid Communard in order 
to criticize the student protests of May 1968. In one of these papers Henri Peyre wrote, “there 
was little method behind their fury, little clarity of purpose behind their idealism. August Comte 
had uttered the precept, which proved valid in 1871 as it did in Paris in May 1968, that ‘one only 
truly destroys what one knows how to replace.’”82  
The continuing polemical nature of these debates suggests that divisive moments are not 
simply litigated from differing ideological or political perspectives. Rather, polemicists approach 
controversial events as adherents to competing versions of the nation itself. They draw upon 
previous narratives, whose authors had put forth their own definitions of the nation, but they alter 
those definitions as it suits their circumstances. Because nationalism requires an active attempt to 
construct an imagined community and because influential political movements always disagree 
about the nature of that community, it cannot be a stable or coherent ideology. As the civil 
struggles of eighteenth and nineteenth century France demonstrate, the meaning of the nation is 
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contested alongside the meaning of events, and the nation’s values, membership, and history are 
subject to continuous debate.  
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APPENDIX: Images 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. G. Donjean, Courage, 1848. 
Lithograph, 26 x 19.2 cm. Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, Paris. 
 
Figure 1. Unknown 
Artist, Songez qu'il 
faudra du courage 
pour tué ces gens la, 
1791. Etching, 13 x 
17 cm. Bibliothèque 
nationale de la 
France, Paris.  
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Figure 3. Maximilien Luce, A Street in Paris in May 1871: The Commune, 1903-05. Oil on 
canvass, 150 x 225.5cm. Musée d’Orsay, Paris. 
 
 
Figure 4. Ernest Meissonier, The 
Barricade, rue de la Mortellerie,  
1848. Oil on canvass, 29 x 22 cm. 
Musée du Louvre, Paris. 
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Figure 5. Ernest 
Pichio, The 
Triumph of Order, 
1875. Engraving 
after painting. 
Bibliothèque 
Nationale de 
France, Paris. 
 
Figure 6. Edouard Manet, The 
Barricade, 1871. Lithograph. 
Rosenwald Collection, National 
Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. 
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Figure 7. Louis Breton, Paris Brûlé par 
la Commune, cover art. 21 June, 1871. 
Bibliothèque nationale de la France, 
Paris. 
 
Figure 8. Frédéric Lix, Les Incendaries : 
les pétroleuses et leur complices, 1871. Le 
Monde Illustré, no. 738, 341. 
Bibliothèque nationale de la France, 
Paris.  
 
Figure 9. Bertall, “la 
Barricade,” 1871. Lithograph. 
Les Communeux, 1871: 
Types, caractères, costumes, 
plate 37. Bibliothèque 
nationale de la France, Paris. 
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Figure 10. Unknown Artist, A Versailles, à Versailles du 5 Octobre 1789, 1789. Engraving, 18 x 
28 cm. Bibliothèque nationale de la France, Paris.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Bertall, Pétroleuses, 
1871. Lithograph. Les 
Communeux, 1871: Types, 
caractères, costumes, plate 20. 
Bibliothèque nationale de la 
France, Paris.  
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